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Abstract
Prompted by recent recognitions of the omnipresence of horizontal gene transfer among microbial species and the associated empha-
sis on exchange, rather than isolation, as the driving force of evolution, this essay will reﬂect on hybridization as one of the central con-
cerns of nineteenth-century biology. I will argue that an emphasis on horizontal exchange was already endorsed by ‘biology’ when it
came into being around 1800 and was brought to full fruition with the emergence of genetics in 1900. The true revolution in nine-
teenth-century life sciences, I maintain, consisted in a fundamental shift in ontology, which eroded the boundaries between individual
and species, and allowed biologists to move up and down the scale of organic complexity. Life became a property extending both ‘down-
wards’, to the parts that organisms were composed of, as well as ‘upwards’, to the collective entities constituted by the relations of
exchange and interaction that organisms engage in order to reproduce. This mode of thinking was crystallized by Gregor Mendel
and consolidated in the late nineteenth-century conjunction of biochemistry, microbiology and breeding in agro-industrial settings. This
conjunction and its implications are especially exempliﬁed by Wilhelm Johannsen’s and Martinus Beijerinck’s work on pure lines and
cultures. An understanding of the subsequent constraints imposed by the evolutionary synthesis of the twentieth century on models
of genetic systems may require us to rethink the history of biology and displace Darwin’s theory of natural selection from that history’s
centre.
 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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C1. Introduction
William Provine once argued that the evolutionary ‘syn-
thesis’ of the 1930s and 1940s should rather be called an
‘evolutionary constriction’, because it consisted in ‘a vast
cut-down in variables considered important in the evolu-
tionary process’ (Provine, 1992, pp. 176–177). One of the
most notable exclusions was hybridization, which many1369-8486/$ - see front matter  2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (200pre-synthesis evolutionists believed to be an important fac-
tor in evolution. Speciation was supposed to occur exclu-
sively through the geographical separation of populations
and subsequent independent development of these popula-
tions, resulting in their genetic isolation. Recent advances
in understanding microbial phylogeny and evolution pres-
ent a picture that extends far beyond this ‘sterile concep-
tion of evolution’ (Sapp, 2007, this section) and bringsultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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back an alternative view of evolution that emphasizes
exchange, rather than isolation, as a driving force of evolu-
tion (see the tables in Sapp 2003, p. 205).
In this essay I want to take a look at hybridization as
one of the central concerns of nineteenth-century biology.
In particular, I will argue that the emphasis on horizontal
exchange, that currently preoccupies present-day evolu-
tionary microbiology and microbial phylogeny (e.g. Gogar-
ten & Townshend, 2005), was 1) endorsed already by
‘biology’ when it came into being around 1800, and 2)
brought to full fruition with the emergence of genetics in
1900. Attention to microscopic and sub-microscopic enti-
ties accompanied these two deﬁning events in the history
of biology, but was not suﬃcient to bring them about. Size,
to put it diﬀerently, never mattered for biology (cf. O’Mal-
ley & Dupre´ 2007). What mattered instead was a funda-
mental shift in ontology that eroded the age old
dichotomy of individual and species, and allowed biologists
to move up and down the scale of organic complexity. Life
became a property extending both ‘downwards’, to the
parts (‘organic molecules’, cells, tissues, organs) that organ-
isms were composed of, as well as ‘upwards’, to the collec-
tive entities (varieties, species, ecosystems like coral reefs)
constituted by the relations of exchange and interaction
that organisms engage in order to reproduce. The ‘constric-
tion’ that was brought about by the modern synthesis thus
appears to document a tactical move, rather than a concep-
tual revolution. It was meant to save classical natural his-
tory—the natural history of paradigmatic organisms like
insects, birds and mammals (including humans), and its
clear-cut distinction of individuals and species—from the
consequences of this shift in ontology.
2. What biology is
It is a well established historical fact that the term ‘biol-
ogy’ only came into use around 1800. Michel Foucault and
Franc¸ois Jacob, in particular, have identiﬁed ‘organization’
as the key concept of the new science, which Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus termed ‘biol-
ogy’ in 1802 (Foucault, 1966, pp. 238–245; Jacob, 1993,
Ch. 2). To gain a full understanding of this terminological
innovation, however, it is important to recognize the inter-
individual dimensions of the concept of ‘organization’. On
the face of it, organization seems to refer to the individual
organic body and its peculiar structure. However, as both
Foucault and Jacob emphasized, it was the ‘hidden archi-
tecture’ (Jacob, 1993, p. 82) of reproductive relations con-
necting parts of organized wholes, rather than their
manifest structure, which became the focus of ‘biology’.
Organic functions like generation, growth, development,
nutrition and sensation were increasingly perceived not as
functions carried out by individual entities, but as func-
tions resulting from the coordinated interaction of individ-1 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
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ual, but interdependent entities (Roger, 1993, pp. 567–582;
Jacob, 1993, pp. 88–92; Lenoir, 1982, Ch. 1; McLaughlin,
1990, pp. 44–51). Georges Louis Leclerc Comte de Buﬀon
(1707–1788) had already expressed this programmatically
in 1749:
The history [. . . of the species] ought to treat only rela-
tions, which the things of nature have among themselves
and with us. The history of an animal ought to be not
only the history of the individual, but that of the entire
species. It ought to include their conception, the time of
gestation, their birth, the number of young, the care
shown by the parents, their sort of education, their
instinct, the places where they live, their nourishment
and their manner of procuring it, their customs, their
instinctual cleverness, their hunting, and, ﬁnally, the ser-
vices which they can render to us and all the uses which
we can make of them. (Quoted from Lyon & Sloan,
1981, p. 111)
Along similar lines, Buﬀon’s life-long rival and adversary,
the Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus, claimed that one had
to follow ‘the various routes through the vast provinces
of the kingdom of plants’, and observe the budding, the an-
nual succession, the development, the habitats, the ﬂower-
ing, and the ecology of plants, ‘to understand the nature of
plants correctly’ (Linnaeus, 1788, pp. 109–110).1 The ‘life
of the species’—das Leben der Gattung as the German nat-
uralist and teacher of Georges Cuvier, Carl Friedrich Kiel-
meyer, called it (Kielmeyer, 1993, p. 5)—or the vital
processes connecting a multiplicity of beings became the
subject of biology. Kielmeyer made it clear, in this context,
that ‘life’ as he understood it extended both ways, both
‘down’ to the ‘organs’ and ‘organic materials’ making up
individual bodies, and ‘up’ to ‘that higher system of eﬀects’
that connected members of a species, and species in the
‘natural system’ (Lenoir, 1982, pp. 38–39). Generation,
that age old, enigmatic concept, began to develop a Janus
face in consequence. On the one hand generation came to
designate the delicate moment in which a fragment of an
organism broke away (or two fragments broke away to
unite in a third) and started to develop and multiply on
its own, thereby forming a new being. Early cell theory
thrived on analogies between the world of ‘infusoria’ and
the elementary components of more complex organisms,
considering ‘the small organism as an element of the large
one’ (Jacob, 1993, p. 116). Organisms came to be seen as
integrated collectives, a ‘plant or an animal represented a
colony of . . . smaller individuals’ (Sapp, 2003, p. 83). On
the other hand, generation began to acquire a new, addi-
tional meaning, that of a collective of individual organisms
sharing the same age, whether they formed a population
born around the same time or whether they occupied the
same developmental stage. This was a conceptual innova-
tion of fundamental importance for nineteenth-centuryultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
S. Mu¨ller-Wille / Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. xxx (2007) xxx–xxx 3
SHPSC 371 No. of Pages 11, Model 5+
5 October 2007; Disk Used
ARTICLE IN PRESSbiology, since it prepared the framework in which it be-
came possible to see variation and inheritance as intercon-
nected problems of hereditary transmission (Parnes, 2007).
‘Evolutionary history’ (Entwicklungsgeschichte), most
notably in the work of Karl Ernst von Baer, became a term
that systematically articulated the development of individ-
uals alongside the generational succession of beings. Both
the cell lineages making up individual bodies, and the gene-
alogical lineages making up species, formed a single tree of
life (Lenoir, 1982, pp. 72–95). This was a tree, to be sure,
bifurcating and anastomosing, but a coral reef rather than
an oak tree of life (Mu¨ller-Wille, 2007).T
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3. Hybrids and life’s maelstrom
A research tradition in the nineteenth century which
made consistent and conscious use of this perspective on
evolution was the research tradition of ‘hybridism’. It
included such ﬁgures as Karl Friedrich Ga¨rtner, Charles
Naudin, William Herbert, Charles Darwin, Carl Na¨geli,
and, somewhat erratically, Gregor Mendel. This tradition
has been systematically underrated in the aftermath of
the modern synthesis. Since the mid eighteenth century,
hybridization was identiﬁed as a source of variation, along-
side migration and subsequent climatic degeneration,
which were factors that could explain the puzzling distribu-
tional patterns biogeographers and palaeontologists came
up with (Larson, 1994, Ch. 3). By the mid nineteenth cen-
tury hybridization had come to be seen as a process subject
to ‘evolutionary laws’ (Entwickelungsgesetze) that could be
uncovered by experimental and mathematical means (Glib-
oﬀ 1999). Hybrids had once been paradigmatic for the
irregularities occasionally produced by nature (Zirkle
1935).2 With the advent of the modern period they became
constitutive of the natural order.
In hindsight, and with the adoption of Ernst Mayr’s so-
called biological species concept, the research tradition of
hybridism appears to be hopelessly confused. In so far as
hybridists were interested in the origin of species, their
observations and experiments could amount to nothing.
The ‘species’ they worked with were either ‘good’ species,
in which case they failed to produce fertile oﬀspring and
thus contributed nothing to the evolution of organic forms,
or they were mere varieties whose combination, while
resulting in fertile oﬀspring, would not by themselves tran-
scend the variation that was present anyway within the spe-
cies to which they belonged. Hybridization, therefore,
could well be a source for intraspeciﬁc variation but could
not by itself account for the origin of new species. For that,
other processes, notably mutation and geographic isola-
tion, had to be taken into account. It is in this sense, for
example, that Ernst Mayr maintained that Gregor Mendel
‘had little idea what a species was’ (Mayr, 1982, pp. 712–2 Bazopoulou-Kykanidou (2001) shows that this view still dominates public
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713). The agenda of hybridizers went far beyond a mere
preoccupation with the origin of new species, however.
Ga¨rtner, one of the most inﬂuential early hybridizers, for-
mulated this agenda as one of ‘determining’ species. ‘The
question of what distinguishes species from varieties’, Ga¨rt-
ner explained,
is . . . a purely biological one: a secure foundation for
determining species cannot be found solely in abstrac-
tion, neither in the characters, nor in the intermediate
forms, but has to be sought in reﬂection, that is in the
individual history [individuellen Geschichte] of each spe-
cies, its whole development [Entwickelung], and not in a
particular aspect only. (Ga¨rtner, 1849, p. 151)
What Ga¨rtner had in mind with the philosophical term
‘reﬂection’ becomes clearer when one looks at the deﬁni-
tion he gave of species:
The essence of the species . . . consists in the determined
relationship its sexual forces possess with respect to
other species. This relationship, in addition to the spe-
ciﬁc form, is a proper, particular, and constant one in
each species. In this respect, form and essence are one.
(Ibid., p. 163; translation partly based on Olby, 1985,
p. 33)
What distinguishes species are not the characters that this
or that particular organic form might possess—‘external
aﬃnities’ as Ga¨rtner called them—but the constant eﬀects
that were produced when one organism, or rather part of
an organism, acted on another to produce a third. Hybrid-
ization was a means to uncover the ‘internal’ or ‘elective’
aﬃnities among organisms (Olby, 1985, Ch. 2).
Two remarks are pertinent here. The ﬁrst pertains to the
chemical analogies Ga¨rtner employed. ‘Elective aﬃnity’
was a chemical term at the time, referring to the ability
of certain substances to displace others from a chemical
compound. Ga¨rtner was careful, however, not to equate
life with chemistry. The analogy referred to the possibility
of analysing life in a similar manner to the way chemists
analysed ‘dead nature’ rather than to the subject matter
of that analysis. With respect to organisms one had to
assume that it was
the two material substrates of the sexes in plants and
their mutual attraction which cause the ability to pro-
duce hybrids. In what, however, the particular quality
of one or the other factor consists, can neither be
answered by microscopic nor chemical examinations,
as we are dealing with a purely vital activity. (Ga¨rtner,
1849, p. 186)
Life, therefore, could not be analysed adequately simply by
subjecting organisms to external observation and chemical
operations. Life had to be analysed by manipulating life by
life itself, by having living entities act on one another, justdiscourses about biotechnology.
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like the chemist determined chemical substances by letting
such substances react with one another.
The second point pertains to the ease with which Ga¨rt-
ner switches from talking about organisms to talking about
the submicroscopic entities (‘factors’) that mediate their
reproduction. It was Gregor Mendel, in his famous exper-
iments with peas, who made full use of this metaphorical
potential, by systematically drawing analogies between
whole organisms, individual traits and ‘elements’ contained
in reproductive cells. As is well known, Mendel used pea
varieties in his experiments that diﬀered from one another
only with respect to a single character pair, and he assumed
that the gametes that these varieties produced were equally
distinguished by a single diﬀerence only. By bringing such
gametes together through hybridization, Mendel was thus
able to manipulate his experimental plants at precisely
deﬁned, albeit invisible, points of overall organization, all
the way from the organismic down to the cellular level. It
follows from this that Mendel’s theoretical approach was
biological through and through. Although he followed a
reductive strategy in explanation, the cytological ‘elements’
he identiﬁed as being involved in the determination of plant
form were neither chemical substances, nor organic forces,
but structural (though not necessarily particulate) elements
of reproductive cells. What Mendel achieved by his exper-
imental analysis was a kind of anatomy of inheritance
(Mu¨ller-Wille & Orel, 2007).
While the way in which Mendel presented his results
may have seemed idiosyncratic to his contemporaries, the
general reasoning that underwrote his experiments was
not. By the mid nineteenth century organic reproduction
had generally come to be seen as a system of circulating ele-
mentary entities—Keime and Anlagen as Immanuel Kant
had called them—which freely separated themselves from
individuals, and combined to form new individuals. Dar-
win expressed this ‘microbiological’ perspective on macro-
scopic life in a passage of his Variation of plants and
animals under domestication (1868) that merits full
quotation.
The fertilized germ of one of the higher animals, sub-
jected as it is to so vast a series of changes from the ger-
minal cell to old age—incessantly agitated by what
Quatrefages well calls tourbillon vital [the maelstrom of
life]—is perhaps the most wonderful object in nature.
It is probable that hardly a change of any kind aﬀects
either parent, without some mark being left on the germ.
But on the doctrine of reversion, as given in this chapter
the germ becomes a far more marvelous object, for,
besides the visible changes which it undergoes, we must
believe that it is crowded with invisible characters,
proper to both sexes, to both the right and left side of
the body, and to a long line of male and female ances-
tors separated by hundreds or even thousands of gener-
ations from the present time: and these characters, like
those written on paper with invisible ink, lie ready to
be evolved whenever the organization is disturbed byPlease cite this article in press as: Mu¨ller-Wille, S., Hybrids, pure c
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certain known or unknown conditions. (Darwin, 1988,
pp. 30–31)
Jonathan Hodge has emphasized Darwin’s lifelong interest
in colonial organisms—an interest which allowed him to
draw analogies between entities above the level of the indi-
vidual organism, such as species and populations, to enti-
ties below that level, such as buds, cells and gemmules
(Hodge 1985). The same perspective transpires from the
passage just quoted. The metaphor of the ‘maelstrom of
life’ makes this particularly clear. It is borrowed from Ar-
mand de Quatrefages’s L’espe`ce humaine, a book preoccu-
pied with the defence of human monogenism on the basis
of the fact that humans of diﬀerent races freely interbreed.
Despite this subject, and despite the book’s title, it was not
the serendipity of human life that the metaphor of tourbil-
lon vital referred to, but rather the ‘curious movement . . . in
that quasi-carnal substance that covers the calcareous or
siliceous skeleton of certain marine organisms’ (Quatref-
ages, 1879, p. 3). Both Darwin and Quatrefages nicely dem-
onstrate the degree to which, by the late nineteenth
century, individuals had been resolved in an underlying
system of circulating, sub-microscopic entities only to re-
emerge as ephemeral and contingent results from the inter-
action of such entities, both with one another, and with
their respective environments.E
4. Manipulating life
Robert Olby has demonstrated that Gregor Mendel did
not share the twentieth-century notion of genes as paired,
particulate, constituent elements of cells (Olby 1979). But
neither did the early Mendelians (see, e.g., Meijer 1985).
What united early Mendelians, including Mendel himself,
was not so much a common model of hereditary transmis-
sion, but rather a peculiar style of reasoning. I believe
that this style of reasoning can be characterized by two
dispositions that make themselves already obvious in
Mendel.ultu
7),above already, worked with pea varieties diﬀering in
(1) A disposition for reduction. Mendel, as pointed out
single character pairs. Yet he referred to these varie-
ties as ‘species’ (Arten), because they bred true, that
is, they reproduced their diﬀerences constantly under
controlled, external conditions. Mendel could thus
treat his model organisms as if they were character-
ized by a very small set of properties only, and he sys-
tematically neglected the wealth of properties they
possessed in other respects. This connects with a sec-
ond reductionist move made by Mendel. From the
diﬀerences in the macroscopic structure of his model
organisms, he concluded that their reproductive cells
also diﬀered with respect to one ‘element’ or ‘factor’
only. He was thus able to present his experiments
as instantiating direct manipulations of gametes and
zygotes (or Befruchtungszellen and Grundzellen, asres, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
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he called them). Mendel used his model organisms,
therefore, as precision tools for manipulating the unit
of life, the cell (Mu¨ller-Wille & Orel 2007).
(2) A disposition for construction. Through hybridzation,
Mendel constructed pedigrees which he regarded not
as objects of his research but as tools to uncover the
genetic constitution. He understood the genetic con-
stitution as an organic structure of the parental gen-
eration or, more precisely, of the zygotes formed by
the parental generation. As the philosopher of biol-
ogy Jean Gayon put this: ‘Heredity was not the
sum total of ancestral inﬂuences; it was a question
of structure in a given generation. What happened
to the progeny did not depend on what happened
to the ancestors of its parents, but only on the genetic
makeup of its parents’ (Gayon, 2000, p. 77). Mendel’s
constructive attitude becomes particularly apparent
in his backcrossing experiments. What he proved in
these experiments was that a hybrid form, united with
one of its parental species, would reproduce the
parental, non-hybrid form instantaneously in a deter-
minate fraction of its oﬀspring, because a certain frac-
tion of the hybrid’s reproductive cells was of the same
kind as the reproductive cells produced by the paren-
tal species. In a certain sense, then, it was possible to
‘build up’ organisms from elementary building
blocks, without having to rely on organic forces
which could only unfold their eﬀects over historical
time spans (as Ga¨rtner, like most nineteenth-century
evolutionists, still believed).
Wilhelm Johannsen, the Danish botanist, who in 1903
showed experimentally that selection had no eﬀect in what
he called ‘pure lines’ of organisms, and who in 1909 coined
the terms ‘gene’, ‘genotype’, and ‘phenotype’ on this basis
(Roll-Hansen, 1989), clearly shared these two dispositions.
The ﬁrst thing to note about his early career in this respect
is that he did not start oﬀ as a student in botany or zool-
ogy, but as an apprentice in pharmacy. By training,
Johannsen was a chemist, and chemistry, not physics,
was for him, and for many other scientists of his genera-
tion, the queen of sciences (Bensaude-Vincent, 2002).
This perspective had far-reaching eﬀects. For Johannsen
ancestral inheritance was a ‘mystical expression for a ﬁc-
tion’ (Johannsen 1911, p. 138), and his contempt for biol-
ogists endorsing such views—especially Ernst Haeckel—
was profound (Johannsen, 1914). Johannsen stressed that
the genotype had to be treated as independent of any life
history and thus as an ‘ahistoric’ entity amenable to anal-
ysis just like the objects of chemistry. ‘Chemical com-
pounds have no compromising ante-act, H2O is always
H2O, and reacts always in the same manner, whatsoever
may be the history of its formation or the earlier states
of its elements’ he stated in 1911, and added: ‘I suggest that
it is useful to emphasize [a] ‘‘radical’’ ahistoric genotype
conception in its strict antagonism to the transmission- or
phenotype view’ (Johannsen, 1911, p. 139). ‘Ancestry byPlease cite this article in press as: Mu¨ller-Wille, S., Hybrids, pure c
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itself is irrelevant; dispositions are decisive’, was how
Johannsen put it provocatively in his 1905 textbook Arveli-
ghedens elementer (Johannsen, 1905, p. 216).
However, just like Ga¨rtner more than half a century ear-
lier, Johannsen drew this analogy with chemistry not with
respect to its subject matter, but with respect to the analyt-
ical method it employed. Over his entire career Johannsen
astutely resisted the temptation to identify ‘genes’ or ‘geno-
types’ with any part or particle of the organism, even when
the Morgan school was reaching its triumphs by success-
fully mapping genes to chromosomes. For him, the geno-
type was not localized in the body of the organism, just
as hydrogen and oxygen were not localized in a body of
water. Just as elements were chemically deﬁned by the reac-
tions they underwent when forming compounds, genotypes
were deﬁned by the ‘reactions’ they underwent when joined
in a zygote. The ‘personal qualities’ of individual organ-
isms, or the phenotype, resulted from these reactions, but
did not determine the genotype.
Personal qualities are then the reactions of the gametes
joining to form the zygote; but the nature of the gametes
is not determined by the personal qualities of the parents
or ancestors in question. This is the modern view of
heredity. (Johannsen, 1911, p. 130; original emphasis)
Despite its reductionism, this was an entirely biological
view, as the fundamental elements it referred to were bio-
logical entities, not chemical or physical ones.
This is where the next step in Johannsen’s career
becomes relevant, as it added an even stronger biological
element. In 1881 Johannsen was appointed research assis-
tant at the Carlsberg Laboratory, a private research labo-
ratory in Copenhagen associated with but largely
independent of the famous Carlsberg brewery. Here, he
worked in the chemistry section, applying analytic methods
to determine organic nitrogen developed by the head of the
chemistry section, Johan Kjeldal, to study metabolic pro-
cesses connected with ripening and germination in plants,
especially barley. In 1887 Johannsen left the Carlsberg
Laboratory to take up a lectureship at the Royal Veteri-
nary and Agricultural College in Copenhagen, a position
he held until he was appointed professor of botany at
Copenhagen University in 1905. He continued his collabo-
ration with the Carlsberg Laboratory, now turning to
experiments in breeding high quality strains of barley (Nils-
son-Ehle, 1927; Roll-Hansen, 2005). Both projects were
intimately connected, because the nitrogen content of bar-
ley was an important variable in the brewing process, and
the quality of barley, in consequence, could be assessed
simply by measuring its protein content. The variation of
plant form, therefore, was reduced to variation of a single,
measurable chemical variable (Johannsen, 1899).
It is well known that many of the early Mendelians
worked in contexts of ‘applied’ biology, most notably agri-
cultural breeding (Paul & Kimmelmann, 1988; Palladino,
1990). In 1896, Johannsen published a small booklet on
heredity and variation, in which he claimed that ‘the sci-ultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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ence of heredity is necessary for transformism, but not vice
versa’ (Johannsen, 1896, p. 12), and suggested that a study
of techniques like pedigree breeding could help to elucidate
inheritance. Johannsen’s relationship with breeding
remained uneasy, however. He was clearly aware that the
distinction of genotype and phenotype was not only diﬃ-
cult to draw in practice, but that relying exclusively on
the genotype in practical contexts like breeding would
not be a successful strategy at all. Bigger beans do produce
bigger plants because they provide more nutriment to the
embryo (Johannsen, 1905, p. 177), so Johannsen knew
about those factors we would nowadays call ‘epigenetic’.
The pure line was not characterized by a certain phenotypic
property, but by the way in which its oﬀspring developed—
and that behaviour was not simply observed, but was a
behaviour organisms were made to accord with. The
amount and diﬃculty of the work that went into their con-
struction can hardly be overestimated, and it was corre-
spondingly diﬃcult to grasp the concept of the genotype
on that basis.
Basically, pure lines were produced by isolating one indi-
vidual, and then ‘purifying’ its oﬀspring by selecting out all
deviant individuals from each generation of oﬀspring. As
hybridization by cross-fertilization produced renewed vari-
ability, the easiest way to produce pure lines was with man-
datory self-fertilizers, such as cereals or beans. In self-
fertilizing plants there is ‘no doubt about the father’, as
Johannsen once put it, and the vagaries of ancestry were
thus reduced to a minimum (quoted in Roll-Hansen,
2005, p. 47). When Johannsen prepared his ‘pure line exper-
iments’ for publication in 1903, he wrote a letter to the
famous plant breeding station at Svalo¨f (Sweden). What
he wanted to know was whether selection for certain pheno-
types in the so called ‘pedigree lines’ produced in Svalo¨f still
yielded any eﬀects. One of the plant scientists working at
Svalo¨f, Hermann Nilsson-Ehle, assured him that this was
not the case, and Johannsen included a long discussion of
the work carried out at Svalo¨f in the ﬁnal version of his
paper (Johannsen, 1903, pp. 6–8; see Roll-Hansen, 1978,
on the relationship of Johannsen to Svalo¨f).
The hard work that went into their production is clear
from the answer given by Nilsson-Ehle (Fig. 1), which, with
its many deletions and new starts, expresses both the diﬃ-
culty of producing pure lines and of grasping what they
actually represented. The particular cause of Nilsson-Ehle’s
diﬃculties was the fact that the practical production of
pedigrees involved continuous selection in order to clear
the strains of variants caused by mutations or accidental
cross-fertilizations. The production of pedigrees needed
bureaucratic record keeping (Fig. 2) and hierarchically
organized labour, almost on an industrial scale, with scien-
tiﬁc ‘managers’ at the top, and a basis of unskilled labour
(Fig. 3). It also involved a plurality of localities, regionally,
nationally and internationally, among which the isolated
pedigrees were circulated to test them against a variety of
background conditions (Mu¨ller-Wille, 2005). Left to them-
selves pedigrees would quickly degenerate. So, if selectionPlease cite this article in press as: Mu¨ller-Wille, S., Hybrids, pure c
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produced no eﬀects in pedigree lines, was this not simply
due to the fact that breeders selected them to remain
constant?
With these complexities of plant breeding in mind, it is
highly revealing to note that Johannsen did not refer to
plant breeding but to the pure cultures of bacteriology as
the models for his pure line approach. In the 1913 edition
of his textbook Elemente der exakten Erblichkeitslehre,
Johannsen stated:
It is remarkable in the recent history of biology that
while with respect to micro-organisms enormously
important results were achieved by ‘pure culture’ (i.e.
by culturing with a single cell as starting point), inheri-
tance in higher organisms continued to be studied in a
much cruder, summary and statistical way. But the
methods of Koch and Hansen have the same signiﬁ-
cance for the exact study of microorganisms, as for the
study of inheritance . . . Without pure cultures no clear
insights, but confusion and error! (Johannsen, 1913,
pp. 196–197)
Again, Johannsen’s years at the Carlsberg Laboratory
must be seen as formative in this respect. When he entered
the Carlsberg Laboratory in 1881, it was Emil Christian
Hansen (mentioned above) who headed its bacteriology
section. Hansen adopted the pure culture methods devel-
oped by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in 1883 to prevent
beer from turning sour occasionally. By isolating single
yeast cells by repeated dilution, microscopic examination
and cultivation under sterile conditions, he was able to pro-
duce yeast consisting of beneﬁcial strains of brewer’s yeast
only. The strains were produced and marketed successfully
as ‘Carslberg bottom-yeast No. 1’ in the same year (Teich
1983). As the only illustration of an organism in Hansen’s
Practical studies of fermentation from 1896 shows (Fig. 4),
yeast remained to him what one may call a ‘minimal organ-
ism’, an ‘organism without organs’ as Ernst Haeckel once
referred to protists (see Sapp, 2007, this section). The diﬀer-
ent strains of yeast were only distinguished by the diﬀerent
qualities of the beer they produced. Their production, to be
sure, also involved industrial forms of labour, but it was
much more akin to chemistry than to agriculture (Fig. 5).
Another ﬁgure merits mention in this context. Martinus
Willem Beijerinck is known today as the founder of the
Delft School of Microbiology, and for his work on and
the Tobacco Mosaic Virus. In 1884, he was invited by
the industrialist L. C. van Marken to establish a bacterio-
logical Laboratory at the Dutch Yeast and Alcohol Works.
In order to prepare for this task, Beijerinck visited the
Carlsberg Laboratory in Copenhagen. Back at the labora-
tory of the Dutch Yeast and Alcohol Works, Beijerinck
enjoyed considerable freedom in his research, engaging in
such varied projects as producing yeast cultures free of
pathogenic bacteria, cross-fertilizing wheat to gain stable
varieties (carried out at the Agricultural High School of
Wageningen, where he had been a teacher before), isolating
the nitrogen-ﬁxating Bacillus radicicola from leguminoseultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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Fig. 1. Letter from Herman Nilsson-Ehle to Wilhelm Johannsen, 27 January 1903 (Universitetsbiblioteket, Lunds Universitet, Saml. Nilsson-Ehle,
hermann, kaps. 23; used with the permission of Lund University Library). The text reads in English translation: ‘In the meanwhile I hope that work in this
direction can be taken up in the future, and even if it only can reinforce your published investigations, this work will nonetheless be of signiﬁcance (and
dissipation of Darwinian delusions). Material to start with after all now exists better than anytime before, in the great number of diﬀerent constant
pedigree-sorts which now exist, which, even if they had not been constant to begin with, now, thanks to repeated pedigree-taking, do not give any
spontaneous variations that could disturb the study of individual variation’.
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et. al., 1983; Bos & Theunissen 1995). What inscribes Bei-
jerinck into the history of genetics, however, is the fact that
it was he who ‘rediscovered’ Mendel in 1899. It was Beijer-
inck who pointed de Vries—a close friend of his, who had
also engaged in agricultural research in his early career—to
the importance of Mendel’s paper, of which he possessed
an oﬀprint (Jahn, 1958). When de Vries published his sem-
inal paper ‘Sur la loi de disjonction des hybrides’ in 1900,
Beijerinck reacted immediately with a paper maintaining
the existence of heritable variation in microbes, and adver-
tising microbes as ‘an extremely useful material for the
investigation of the laws of heredity and variation’.
Microbes, he maintained, were easily produced in large
numbers from single individuals. And once pure culture
technologies were mastered, biochemical characters of
microbes provided accurate methods of distinction, as they
could be measured precisely with devices such as the sac-
charometer (Beijerinck, 1921–1940, Vol. 4, p. 37).
What the case of Johannsen demonstrates is that the
conjunctions of biochemistry, microbiology and breedingPlease cite this article in press as: Mu¨ller-Wille, S., Hybrids, pure c
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (200in the industrial mass production of beer provided one of
the contexts that predisposed research to what I have
described at the beginning of this section as the Mendelian
mindset. The apparent lack of structural complexity, often
reducing microbial life to a single character, which was
often only assessable through chemical operations or
in vivo experiments, as well as the fact that microbial life
forms could only be made visible through elaborate genea-
logical constructs—pure cultures or ‘clones’, as they were
later called—inclined microbiologists to a kind of proto-
genetic thinking. Species were replaced, or rather marked
and traced, by speciﬁcities, that is, by the reliably predict-
able eﬀects that organic units produced in their interaction
with other organic units and their environments (Grad-
mann, 2001).
In the case of Johannsen this became especially clear in a
peculiar one-sidedness that marked his later career.
Although he acknowledged the importance of hybridiza-
tion experiments for genetics, he himself never embarked
on crossing experiments. Throughout his career, Johannsen
himself remained content with having reduced his beans to
genotypes, just like bacteriologists in general remained con-ultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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Fig. 2. Hermann Nilsson-Ehle working at his desk at the Svalo¨f Plant Breeding Station, ca. 1912 (from Newman, 1912, p. 111).
Fig. 3. Women working on a ﬁeld for multiplying peas at the Svalo¨f Plant Breeding Station, 1907 (from Enge, 1986, p. 39; used with the permission of
Svalo¨f Weibull B).
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for another thirty years, despite Beijerinck’s early call to
use microbes as model organisms of genetics (Singleton,
2000). As Frederick Churchill commented, Johannsen
embarked on a ‘vertical’ analysis of the genotype, while it
was the Morgan school that realized the potential for a
‘horizontal’ analysis in mapping the genes of DrosophilaPlease cite this article in press as: Mu¨ller-Wille, S., Hybrids, pure c
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (200(Churchill, 1974). When microorganisms, notably E. coli
and its phages, ﬁnally became the subject of classical genet-
ics in the 1940s and 1950s, they characteristically did so as
systems involving multiple viral transductions and the bac-
terial transformation of genetic material, which allowed the
simulation of the exchange of genetic material in diploid
organisms (Holmes, 2006).ultures, and pure lines: From nineteenth-century ..., Studies in
7), doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.012
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Fig. 4. Cells of Carslberg bottom-yeast No. 1 (from Hansen, 1896, p. 87).
Fig. 5. Apparatus for the production of Carslberg bottom-yeast No. 1 (from Hansen, 1896, p. 42).
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5. Conclusion
The agro-industrial contexts that furthered the emer-
gence of genetics around 1900 through the conjunctions
of biochemistry, microbiology and the breeding of higher
organisms they provided were clearly sites dominated by
an interest in reducing life to something that can be circu-
lated and recombined with predictable eﬃciency (Mendel-
sohn, 2005). This, however, should not distract attention
from the fact that the industrial world was an exceedingly
complex world, dominated as much, if not even more, by
exchange and cooperation as by isolation and competition.
Breaking organisms down to genes and communities of
microorganisms into ‘species’ were activities often per-
formed to gain control over complex problems that seemed
out of reach of any kind of analysis: breeding for physio-
logical characters like winter hardiness or resistance to
pathogens; assimilation of gaseous nitrogen by microbes
inhabiting the root nodules of leguminous plants; produc-
ing vaccines immunizing against contagious diseases. Ser-
geij Vinogradsky, whose work as well was carried out in
contexts informed by agro-industrial concerns, always
‘supported a staunch monomorphism’ and the pure culture
methods associated with it, even though he was acutely
aware of the ecological complexity of microbial communi-
ties (Ackert, 2006, p. 380). The language of engineering
that permeates present day microbiology when it comes
to describe the complex systems that make up the microbial
world provides us with a constant reminder of this relation-
ship (see Shapiro, 2007, this section). What I have tried to
argue, then, in this essay is that genetic systems, whether
hosted by microbes or macrobes, are systems of exchange
that systematically cut across notions of a one-to-one rela-
tionship between individuals and species. Individuals of
diﬀerent kinds merge in hybridization to form individuals
of a new, third kind, and the borders of kinds become per-
meable as a consequence. Problematizing species in these
two senses has a long history that goes back to the origins
of modern biology in the early nineteenth century. The evo-
lutionary synthesis of the twentieth century, as I see it, was
an attempt to focus on one particular model of genetic sys-
tems only—speciation by isolation—and to reinstate a
clear one-to-one relation between individual and species.
This relationship was vital for the long-standing practices
of classical natural history and was, in a sense, an attempt
to save natural history from the consequences of biology. If
molecular microbiology forces us today, as Jan Sapp
argues in this section, to rethink biology, it will also force
us to rethink the history of biology. The true revolution
of the nineteenth century did not occur with Darwin’s the-
ory of natural selection, but with cell theory. Darwin, of
course, had a share in this revolution as well with his theory
of pangenesis, but it is one that needs to be rediscovered.
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